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In Support of International Trade: Business Leaders Speak Out (Summary) 
 
The Committee for Economic Development (CED) has been a consistent voice in support 
of U.S. leadership for an open global trade regime.  This policy update reiterates a 
fundamental truth: An open and vibrant trading system is vital to the economic well being 
of all Americans.  During this period of economic distress and heightened sensitivity to 
the effects of economic policy, it is especially important for the United States to reaffirm 
its commitment to free and open trade.  Historically, business leadership has played a key 
role in helping the public and its elected representatives to recognize the importance of 
open trade to our collective prosperity. 
 
Recent CED policy statements on trade have called for U.S. leadership in international 
negotiations to reach the goals of freer global trade; a comprehensive domestic agenda to 
develop a national constituency that understands and supports a strong and open global 
trading system; and policies that all major contributors to the persistent global trade 
imbalances could take to sustain a global economic recovery.  Specifically, 
 
• U.S. policy should lead a revitalization of the Doha Round of trade negotiations by 
committing to the goals of de-linking all agricultural subsidies from prices and 
production levels while providing open access to our markets for all developing 
country agriculture exports, eliminating quotes and tariffs on manufactured goods, 
and removing global barriers on services trade.  
 
• The United States should work toward national consensus on trade by establishing an 
aggressive and effective adjustment policy that helps workers in transition.  CED 
supports a wage-insurance program to protect workers from income losses associated 
with job change.   
 
• The United States should work toward a multilateral cooperative approach to the 
necessary rebalancing of global trade and financial flows.  The United States must 
avoid a protectionist response in defending domestic jobs; it should increase national 
saving by reducing its “on-budget” fiscal deficit as much and as quickly as 
practicable. Europe and Japan should pursue structural and macroeconomic policies 
to strengthen domestic demand. China should expand public consumption in health 
care, education, public pensions, and associated basic social programs. Financial 
reforms to improve the intermediation of private saving would raise private 
consumption and improve the efficiency of private investment.  In the longer run, 
China should move to a market-determined exchange rate.   
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In Support of International Trade: Business Leaders Speak Out 
 
Some truths bear repeating:  
 
• “The United States has a major interest in the expansion of world commerce.  We are 
a powerful industrial nation.  We need vast quantities of goods and services of many 
kinds.  We have a large margin of efficient production capacity which can be put to 
work making things for international trade.  We can exchange these things with the 
people of other countries who, themselves, make other things available for trade—
other things better or cheaper or different than we can or want to make.”i 
 
• “[T]he significant long-term benefits of open trade and ‘outsourcing’ to the American 
economy have been widely demonstrated.  Trade gives our economy lower-cost 
goods and gives our companies the resources to be competitive.  Trade is a substantial 
part of the exceptional dynamism that creates jobs and growth in America.  This is no 
time to lose our resolve to enhance U.S. prosperity through trade.”ii 
 
The first of these two statements was made by the Committee for Economic 
Development in 1945, the second in 2005.  For those like us who see open trade as 
overwhelmingly in the nation’s interest, the need to review the logic and experience of 
trade, to restate the position again and again over 60 years, is to defend the obvious. 
 
And yet, with every economic downturn, the need arises again.  It is easy to point to a 
single job lost to apparent competition from imports.  It is harder to point to export jobs 
maintained, or to the jobs that exports indirectly support, or to the lower-priced goods 
that hard-pressed consumers can afford because of imports.  It is harder still to explain 
that protectionism at home inevitably will breed further protectionism abroad. 
 
Now, in 2009, as we survey an economic landscape wracked by global recession and 
financial crisis of historic proportions, we find it necessary to reiterate: An open and 
vibrant trading system is vital to the economic well being of all Americans. 
 
In the recent past, the “trade issue” has been mostly a debate over the relative benefits 
and costs of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the negotiating rounds of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  But 
now, the threats to open trade arising from the 2007-2009 recession are manifest in data 
showing declining global trade, in policies pursued by national governments intent on 
stimulating and protecting domestic economic activity, and in the numerous news reports 
of incidental activities that have the cumulative effect of dampening international 
commerce.   
 
The World Trade Organization projects a global decline in trade of about 9 percent in 
volume terms in 2009.iii  The World Bank reported that 17 of the G-20 countries had 
adopted measures to protect domestic producers from foreign competition.iv  Measures 
such as a “Buy American” provision in US law are replicated elsewhere as “Buy British,” 
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“Buy French,” or “Buy Chinese.”  The European Union, among other actions, is 
considering a directive that would place heavy regulatory burdens on foreign financial 
managers, thereby favoring European financial managers.v 
 
Certainly one expects trade activity to taper off as total economic activity declines in a 
global recession.  But trade monitors like the WTO point out that protectionist measures 
are on the rise, and the reduction in trade volume has been out of proportion with even 
the oversized economic downturn.  The lack of will on the part of governments of leading 
trading nations to make economically smart rather than politically popular decisions has 
amplified the trade reduction caused by the economic slowdown. 
 
It is not that political leaders do not understand the issue.  The following is from the 
official communiqué issued at the close of the G20 London Summit:  
 
World trade growth has underpinned rising prosperity for half a 
century.  But it is now falling for the first time in 25 years.  Falling 
demand is exacerbated by growing protectionist pressures and a 
withdrawal of trade credit.  Reinvigorating world trade and investment is 
essential for restoring global growth. We will not repeat the historic  
mistakes of protectionism of previous eras.vi 
 
To implement this pledge G-20 leaders agreed to:  
 
• refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, 
imposing new export restrictions, or implementing WTO-inconsistent measures to 
stimulate exports;   
• minimize any negative impact on trade and investment of domestic policy actions 
including fiscal policy and action in support of the financial sector;   
• not retreat into financial protectionism, particularly measures that constrain 
worldwide capital flows, especially to developing countries; 
• notify promptly the WTO of any such measures and call on the WTO, together 
with other international bodies, within their respective mandates, to monitor and 
report publicly on adherence to these undertakings on a quarterly basis; 
• take whatever steps possible to promote and facilitate trade and investment;  
• ensure availability of at least $250 billion over the next two years to support trade 
finance through export credit and investment agencies and through the 
Multilateral Development Banks; and 
• remain committed to reaching an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha 
Development Round, which is urgently needed.   
 
The evidence thus far is that these pledges, however sincere when they were made, have 
for the most part not been observed in practice. 
 
What Can the United States Do? 
 
Recent CED policy statements on trade, in 2003, 2005, and 2007, have called for:  
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• a series of recommendations for U.S. leadership in international negotiations to 
reach the goals of freer global trade;vii  
• a comprehensive agenda to develop a national constituency that understands and 
supports a strong and open global trading system;viii and 
• a set of practical policy steps that could be taken by all major contributors to the 
persistent trade imbalances in the world economy, which were an underlying 
cause of the recent recession and continue to be an impediment to sustained 
global economic growth.ix 
A Call for Bold Leadership 
The Doha Round of global trade negotiations is moribund. A successful end to these talks 
is crucial for America’s future economic growth, its international relationships, and its 
security. The Committee for Economic Development has called on the President to take 
decisive and immediate action to break the negotiating stalemate by launching an 
initiative to eliminate trade barriers – beginning with agriculture – at home, and 
challenging others to do the same abroad. 
These steps must be taken not only to enhance the outlook for U.S. economic growth, but 
also to provide an important avenue by which developing countries can pull themselves 
out of poverty—a result strongly in the interests of the United States. Trade spurs 
economic growth and encourages governments to commit to needed domestic reforms. It 
helps to integrate developing countries, both economically and politically, into the global 
system and gives them a stronger stake in that system. It reduces the risk of political 
collapse, which, as seen in places such as Afghanistan and Somalia, can have devastating 
effects on our own security. 
The role of the United States in the world—after September 11, the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the change in Administration, and the recent economic and financial crisis—is 
under intense scrutiny. Other nations watch to see if the United States will continue to 
embrace the core economic principles and institutions that it has supported over the last 
half century: global economic integration through open trade and investment, supported 
by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and 
other multilateral organizations.  
The Doha Development Round provides a critical opportunity to show the world that the 
United States will lead all nations in acknowledging and acting on our responsibilities. 
But the lack of decisive progress in these negotiations has sapped their energy and unduly 
lowered expectations of success. To reinvigorate these talks, the United States should 
begin by seizing the initiative.  This can best be accomplished by coming to the 
negotiating table with an expressed willingness to eliminate existing trade restrictions, 
particularly in the area of agriculture. Doing so could galvanize pro-trade constituencies 
around the world and provide the leadership example for our major trading partners in 
both advanced and developing economies to reciprocate. We recognize that political 
realities and temporary hardships will make it difficult for government leaders 
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everywhere to take these bold steps. But the challenge of leadership is to rise above 
traditional ways of doing things. We appreciate that U.S. officials may be reluctant to 
lead forcefully in the absence of clear indication that other countries will follow. But the 
potential gains are well worth the risks, and the option to revert to a more traditional, 
slower, and less productive negotiating strategy will always remain. 
We also have recommended that U.S. trade policy commit to a series of specific detailed 
steps, including: 
• De-linking all agricultural subsidies from prices and production levels and providing 
open access to our markets for all developing country agriculture exports. We can no 
longer tolerate farm policies that encourage overproduction at the public’s expense while 
impoverishing the developing world. 
• Indicating strongly a desire to eliminate all tariffs and non-tariff barriers (including 
quotas) in manufactured goods, without exception, by a date certain, and challenging 
other countries to do the same. This includes textiles, apparel, and other traditionally 
protected sectors.   
• Taking the lead toward the elimination of all barriers to cross-border trade in services. 
Service exports are the fastest growing category of U.S. export trade and the fastest 
growing sector in many developing countries. 
• Committing ourselves and calling on others to reduce reliance on anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty remedies and pledging to tighten procedures and standards for such 
remedies. 
• Reaffirming the importance of enforceable commitments and adherence to well-defined 
trade rules under WTO while seeking to develop procedures that would reduce 
confrontation and increase the percentage of mediated or negotiated—“out-of-court”—
settlements of trade disputes. 
• Developing and championing adjustment programs throughout U.S. economic sectors 
dislocated by trade, encouraging workers to shift to new employment without resorting to 
protection as an “interim” or “transitional” policy. 
Getting to “Yes” on Trade 
Open trade should, indeed must, be a cornerstone of America's economic policy. It builds 
our economy, enhances our security, and supports American diplomacy around the world. 
We need to forge a national consensus to support this goal, and adjustment policy must 
be a vital part of how we get to "yes" on trade. Many sound analyses have shown that 
trade is not the cause of the economy's slow pace of job creation.  Nevertheless, the fear 
of job loss is very real and makes it difficult for workers to embrace more open trade. 
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Getting to "yes" on trade, therefore, means establishing an aggressive and effective 
adjustment policy that helps workers in transition.  CED has expressed support for a 
wage-insurance program that would protect workers from income losses associated with 
job change, as well as help those workers with job search, health coverage, and training. 
We recognize that there are some workers for whom job loss may present extremely 
difficult circumstances, in part because they may lack the skills or the training to reenter 
the workforce. Adjustment policies must recognize the legitimacy of their needs, eschew 
a “one size fits all” approach, and make every possible effort to encourage and facilitate 
their reemployment. 
 
Previous efforts to forge this kind of adjustment policy have been marked by half-
heartedness and fragmentation. Differing political agendas through the years have created 
many incremental programs. The aggregate cost of numerous adjustment and training 
programs is already large; the benefits of rationalizing and integrating these programs, 
and of eliminating various trade-distorting subsidy programs, would allow us readily to 
afford the cost of addressing more effectively the plight of displaced workers. We should 
aspire to a national policy of economic adjustment, unlike the current Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) system, that would be available to all workers experiencing 
involuntary unemployment for reasons other than their own conduct.  Such a program 
would emphasize, whenever possible, getting back to work.   
 
CED believes that business organizations such as our own must reach out to labor and to 
other groups to initiate the leadership to make the changes needed to form a consensus 
around trade policy, of which trade adjustment must be a central part. Only such a 
collective effort can address the prevailing misunderstanding and mistrust.  
Addressing Global Imbalances 
Since 1991 the global economy has become increasingly “imbalanced,” as the trade 
deficit in the United States and trade surpluses in many foreign countries grew rapidly. In 
2005 and 2006 the U.S. current account deficit (which includes international investment 
income flows and transfer payments as well as trade in goods and services) reached an 
unprecedented 6.1 percent of GDP.  Due to the global recession and the attendant 
collapse in world trade, by the second quarter of 2009 it had receded to 2.8 percent of 
GDP.x   
The counterpart of these U.S. deficits has been large current account surpluses in the oil-
exporting countries, Japan, China, and certain other Asian and European economies, 
which have accumulated extremely large private and public holdings of dollar assets. As 
a consequence, U.S. net international debt rose to 16 percent of GDP in 2006.  By 2008 it 
had risen further to 24 percent.   
These global imbalances have resulted from several factors that developed over the past 
several years, including declining saving in the United States and high saving in the 
surplus countries; an increase in the demand for dollar assets due to globalization; high 
energy prices; exchange rate intervention by China and other countries pursuing export-
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led growth; and greater declines in the prices of U.S.-held foreign stocks relative to 
declines in the prices of foreign-held U.S. stocks.  Some of these long-term factors have 
been altered by the 2008 financial crisis and accompanying recession, such as the recent 
rise in the U.S. household savings rate, but others continue to represent persistent 
structural problems. 
These imbalances provided the large capital inflows that spurred the rise in U.S. 
residential mortgages and the easy flow of credit to sub-prime borrowers, which are at the 
base of the financial crisis; and most still exist today.  Correspondingly, CED’s 
recommendations for addressing global imbalances, which were made in the hope of 
reducing the risk of a financial and economic crisis such as has occurred, remain 
extremely relevant in the current economic environment.  Full global economic recovery 
will not take place without a more balanced set of national policies among the major 
economic actors.   
As a general matter, all economies should contribute to global adjustment, which will 
require both changes in relative prices (exchange rates) and a rebalancing of global 
demand. The sharp drop in international trade that has accompanied the financial crisis 
and global recession has made it even more imperative for those countries with serious 
imbalances to follow the recommendations in CED's 2007 study, "Reducing Global 
Imbalances."  The large surplus companies, such as China, Japan and Germany, must 
strengthen domestic demand.  At the same time, the United States must maintain and 
even improve upon the higher household savings rate that has been recently achieved in 
response to the financial crisis and take steps to reduce substantially the unacceptably 
high future federal budget deficits shown in current projections.   
A multilateral cooperative approach is most likely to be successful in securing 
agreements to undertake the needed adjustments in demand and exchange rates and the 
political “buy in” necessary to implement them properly.  While the global recession is 
causing widespread losses in output, incomes and employment, it has indeed been a 
"wake-up" call for the surplus countries, which now realize that they cannot depend upon 
increasing exports to the United States for their economic growth—or even for their 
recovery from the current economic downturn.  The United States must do its part not to 
allow domestic conditions that contribute to the resumption of large current account 
deficits once financial markets heal and the global economy recovers. 
In particular, The United States, as the preeminent deficit country, must avoid a 
protectionist response in defending its domestic jobs.  Instead, it should increase national 
saving by reducing its “on-budget” fiscal deficit, now further swollen by the economic 
and financial calamity, as much and as quickly as practicable. This fiscal consolidation 
will require comprehensive expenditure reductions as well as increased revenues, which 
might best be pursued through CED’s recommended tax reforms or energy taxes. Private 
saving also should be increased through tax reform and targeted saving initiatives such as 
the maximum possible adoption of “automatic” 401(k) plans by employers.  
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Europe should pursue policies that continue to strengthen domestic demand, including 
structural reforms of product and labor market policies and supportive monetary policy. 
Authorities should refrain from intervention to prevent appreciation of the euro against 
the dollar. 
Japan also should pursue structural reforms and a careful balancing of fiscal and 
monetary normalization that will support growth. Japan should continue to refrain from 
intervention or public statements that impede the yen appreciation that is needed for 
global adjustment. 
China should expand public consumption in health care, education, public pensions, and 
associated basic social programs. Financial reforms to improve the intermediation of 
private saving would raise private consumption and improve the efficiency of private 
investment. The renminbi (RMB) should be allowed to strengthen in the short term, and 
in the longer term China should liberalize its capital account and move to a market-
determined exchange rate.  China's ambitions to see the RMB as a reserve currency will 
only be realized when the RMB trades freely and there is a significant international RMB 
bond market.  With regard to the latter, the announced plan of the Chinese government to 
float its first international RMB bond issue is a welcome development.   
The petroleum exporters should continue to increase public and private investment 
programs to raise domestic demand. Gulf Cooperation Council countries should consider 
following Kuwait’s example in moving from a rigid dollar peg to a more diversified 
currency basket. 
Smaller surplus countries also have a role to play. Some have accumulated very large 
exchange reserves, and in the aggregate they can make a significant contribution to 
adjustment. They should resist the temptation to be “free riders” as larger countries adjust. 
Instead, they should allow exchange rate adjustment and expand domestic demand as 
their individual circumstances permit. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) can and should be more proactive in catalyzing 
governments to consult on and implement adjustment policies. The multilateral 
consultations organized by the IMF in 2006-2007 should be institutionalized in an 
international consultative group to be organized as circumstances require. 
Conclusion 
The international trading system was under tremendous strain before the onset of the 
recent recession.  The economic and political consequences of the recession have only 
added to the pressures on governments to engage in policies that give the appearance of 
generating wholly domestic benefits.  Such appearances are deceiving.  Emulation and 
retaliation by governments that experience the negative consequences of “beggar-thy-
neighbor” policies ensure that protectionism and discrimination against foreign entities 
are self-defeating at best.  And such policies have the potential to create great damage—
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the protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 is credited with deepening and 
prolonging the Great Depression.   
The United States has been the leader of an international trade regime, which since the 
end of World War II has been a cornerstone of economic prosperity.  Business leadership 
must play an important role in helping the public and their representatives in government 
understand that an open and vibrant trading system is vital to the economic well being of 
all Americans.
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